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This paper investigates the relation between Carnap and Quine’s views
on analyticity on the one hand, and their views on philosophical analy-
sis or explication on the other. I argue that the stance each takes on what
constitutes a successful explication largely dictates the view they take on
analyticity. I show that although acknowledged by neither party (in fact
Quine frequently expressed his agreement with Carnap on this subject)
their views on explication are substantially different. I argue that this dif-
ference not only explains their differences on the question of analyticity,
but points to a Quinean way to answer a challenge that Quine posed to
Carnap. The answer to this challenge leads to a Quinean view of analyt-
icity such that arithmetical truths are analytic, according to Quine’s own
remarks, and set theory is at least defensibly analytic.
Introduction
Quine described his differences with Carnap as principally involving analyt-
icity and ontology. This paper will deal only with the first of these problems
— leaving their different views on ontology for another occasion. Concerning
their views on analyticity, it will be shown that their respective positions on
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this issue stem from the differences in their views on what constitute a suc-
cessful explication. Not only this, but each side’s failure to fully understand
his opponent is also explained by the differences in their respective views on
explication. Each side mistakenly believed that they agreed on the notion of an
explication.
After having established the above points, I turn to the question of whether
one can give an explication of analyticity that satisfies Quine’s views on ex-
plication. I argue that Quine’s views on explication themselves suggest a way
of defining analyticity. The resulting notion I call Quinean-analyticity. Finally,
I argue that essentially all of arithmetic and set theory come out as Quinean-
analytic.
In the first section I discuss Carnap’s explicit remarks on explication, and
in the second, those of Quine. In the third section, I discuss the differences
between their accounts and how these differences are of crucial importance
for understanding the debate over analyticity. In the fourth section, I examine
Quine’s own attempted explication of analyticity. The best of these is a notion
that is far too restrictive to be of much interest and, by Quine’s own diagnosis,
is ‘epistemically insignificant’. I propose the concept Quinean-analytic, which
is inspired from Quine’s views on explication. In the fifth and final section, I
argue that much of mathematics comes out as Quinean-analytic in this sense.
1 Carnap on Philosophical Analysis
In 1932, Carnap published ‘Uberwindung der Metaphysik durch Logische Anal-
yse der Sprache’. In this paper, Carnap is mainly concerned with demonstrat-
ing the thesis that metaphysical statements are meaningless. However, the pa-
per includes a brief discussion of a positive thesis as well. The positive thesis
is the claim that over and above the elimination of meaningless statements, the
task of a scientific philosophy is to “clarify meaningful concepts and propo-
sitions, to lay logical foundations for factual science and for mathematics”.
(Carnap, 1996, p. 27) Here we get a glimpse of Carnap’s fundamental beliefs
about what the role of philosophy is. Philosophy is the activity of clarifying
concepts (or propositions) and making clear the logical relations that hold be-
tween them. This positive thesis emphasizes the relationship between the new
scientific philosophy and the tradition from which it emerges. Even specula-
tive metaphysicians were engaged in little, if anything, more than logic and
conceptual analysis. It is the negative thesis, that some classes of statements
have no empirical content and so sufficient clarification is impossible, which
separates logical positivism from much of the tradition. These quite general
views about the role of philosophy first articulated in 1932 were never given
up by Carnap. This is evidenced by Carnap, in the 1957 English translation,
merely appended some clarificatory remarks to the end of the article.
Let us now, then, try to pin down exactly what Carnap’s views on explica-
tion are. Carnap is explicit in his views on conceptual analysis in two places.
He gives a detailed account of conceptual analysis in Logical Foundations of Prob-
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ability (esp. chapter I) and he considers and compares successful analyses in
Meaning and Necessity (esp. §2 and §§7-16). Carnap begins Logical Foundations
of Probability by stating that the purpose of the book is to give a clarification
(this term is used by Carnap along with ‘explication’ as interchangeable with
‘philosophical analysis’) of the notion of probability. He considers an analysis
successful if it fulfills the following requirements:
1. The explicatum is to be similar to the explicandum in such a
way that, in most cases in which the explicandum has been so far
used, the explicatum can be used; however, close similarity is not
required and considerable differences are permitted.
2. The characterization of the explicatum, that is the rules of its
use (for instance, in the form of a definition), is to be given in an
exact form, so as to introduce the explicatum into a well-connected
system of scientific concepts.
3. The explicatum is to be is to be a fruitful concept, that is,
useful for the formulation of many universal statements (empirical
laws in the case of a nonlogical concept, logical theorems in the case
of a logical concept).
4. The explicatum should be as simple as possible; this means as
simple as the more important requirements (1), (2), and (3) permit.
(Carnap, 1950, §3, original italics)
As an example of a successful analysis, Carnap mentions the term ‘fish’ as used
by biologists. He imagines (as probably was the case) that there was a prescien-
tific term ‘fish’ that meant roughly ‘animal that swims around in water’. This
term included marine mammals as fish. The modern scientific concept ‘fish’
applies to most but not all of the same cases as the prescientific concept, thus
(1) is satisfied. The remaining requirements are satisfied by the definition as
well. Carnap stresses the situation is not adequately described by the state-
ment ‘The previous belief that whales (in German even called ‘Walfische’) are
also fish is refuted by zoology.’ (Carnap, 1950, §3) The new concept replaces the
prescientific concept. Sentences predicating ‘fish’ of a whale are not incorrect
if ‘fish’ is used in the prescientific sense. We are free to use either language but
we have good reason to use the scientific language instead of the prescientific
language.
What kind of correspondence is required here between the first
concept, the explicandum, and the second, the explicatum?
Since the explicandum is more or less vague and certainly more
so than the explicatum, it is obvious that we cannot require the
correspondence between the two concepts to be a complete coinci-
dence. But one might perhaps think that the explicatum should be
as close to or as similar with the explicandum as the latter’s vague-
ness permits. However, it is easily seen that this requirement would
be too strong, that the actual procedure of scientists is often not in
agreement with it, and for good reasons. (Carnap, 1950, §3)
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We see then two features stand out concerning Carnap’s account of expli-
cation. First, Carnap rejects any question of correctness. The explicatum is to
replace the explicandum. Second, proposals are to be assessed on practical,
that is pragmatic, grounds. Carnap is well aware of the paradox of analysis.
The phrase ‘paradox of analysis’ comes from C. H. Langford, but it is most
closely associated with G. E. Moore. The paradox of analysis is that no analy-
sis can be both informative and correct. For, if the analysans simply says the
same thing as the analysandum, then it is uninformative. If they say something
different, it is incorrect. After mentioning both Moore and Langford, Carnap
rejects the question of the correctness of an explication.
In a problem of explication the datum, [. . . ] viz., the explican-
dum, is not given in exact terms; if it were, no explication would be
necessary. Since the datum is inexact, the problem itself is not stated
in exact terms; and yet we are asked to give an exact solution. This
is one of the puzzling peculiarities of explication. It follows that, if
a solution for a problem of explication is proposed, we cannot de-
cide in an exact way whether it is right or wrong. Strictly speaking,
the question whether the solution is right or wrong makes no good
sense because there is no clear-cut answer. The question should
rather be whether the proposed solution is satisfactory, whether it
is more satisfactory than another one, and the like. (Carnap, 1950,
§2)
In Meaning and Necessity, Carnap looks at proposals on how to interpret def-
inite descriptions as put forward by Hilbert and Bernays, Russell, and Frege.
Hilbert and Bernays propose using definite descriptions only after the unique-
ness condition (that is, when there is a unique object satisfying the description)
is provably satisfied. Frege proposes having ‘the Φ’ always stand for an ob-
ject — an arbitrary one when uniqueness is not satisfied. Russell’s theory is of
course the well-known theory put forward in his ‘On Denoting’. Concerning
these three views, Carnap writes:
The different interpretations of descriptions are not meant as as-
sertions about the meaning of phrases of the form ‘the so-and-so’ in
English, but as proposals for an interpretation and, consequently,
for deductive rules, concerning descriptions in symbolic systems.
Therefore, there is no theoretical issue of right or wrong between
these various conceptions, but only the practical question of the
convenience of the different methods. (Carnap, 1956, p. 33)
Here again we see Carnap expounding the same view on analysis. An analysis
is meant as a proposal for replacing a certain notion. The proposal is then to
be judged on pragmatic grounds. Questions of correctness are to be replaced
by questions concerning suitability of the new notion for serving as a replace-
ment of the old notion. We will now see that Quine had a very similar view of
explication, but a view that differs from Carnap’s in one crucial respect.
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2 Quine on Philosophical Analysis
Quine acknowledges Carnap’s account of explication in many of his most im-
portant works. Far from being critical of Carnap’s views on explication, Quine
repeatedly endorses them:
There is also, however, a variant type of definitional activity
which does not limit itself to the reporting of pre-existing synonymies.
I have in mind what Carnap calls explication — an activity to which
philosophers are given, and scientists also in their more philosoph-
ical moments. In explication the purpose is not merely to para-
phrase the definiendum into an outright synonym, but actually to
improve upon the definiendum by refining or supplementing its
meaning. (Quine, 1953, p. 25)1
More evidence that Quine agreed with Carnap’s views on explication is given
in a referee report for Logical Foundations of Probability written by Quine. The
report is published in Quine & Carnap (1990). On the review form, Quine is
asked about the ‘incidental achievements’ of the book, and he writes “Clarifies
nature of philosophical explication in general.” (Quine & Carnap, 1990, p. 400)
The importance of explication is also stressed in Word and Object (see esp.
§53). Both Carnap and Quine thought explication was an important philosoph-
ical task. However, they held different views on what constitutes a proper
philosophical analysis. It is not that Carnap thought explication (including
an explication of the conditions for scientific knowledge) was important and
Quine did not. Rather, they both thought this was an important task but held
different standards for successful explications. By examining the difference in
their views on explication we can explain their disagreement over analyticity.
In §53 of Word and Object, Quine lays out the qualities that he believes a
successful philosophical analysis should have. This is Quine’s most detailed,
but certainly not his only, discussion of the features a proper explication. His
other comments are entirely in keeping with the view presented here. The
account, as mentioned, is remarkably similar to that of Carnap (whom he ac-
knowledges). After presenting his own views on philosophical analysis Quine
writes “Philosophical analysis, explication, has not always been seen in this
way”, and then in a footnote he adds “by Carnap, yes, see Meaning and Neces-
sity p. 7 f.” However, there is an important difference between Carnap and
Quine’s views on explication that becomes apparent in §53 (and elsewhere).
The section is titled ‘The ordered pair as a philosophical paradigm’. As the ti-
tle suggests, Quine believes that the various definitions of the ordered pair (e.g.
as 〈x, y〉 = {{x}, {x, y}} or 〈x, y〉 = {{x}, {∅, y} }) satisfy, in an exemplary way,
the conditions for a proper philosophical analysis. Concerning this he states:
This construction is paradigmatic of what we are most typically
up to when in a philosophical spirit we offer an analysis or explica-
1Quine does, however, claim that even this rests ultimately on synonymy. This remark is dis-
cussed later in this paper.
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tion of some hitherto inadequately formulated idea or expression.
We do not claim synonymy. We do not claim to make clear and ex-
plicit what users of the language had in mind all along. We do not
expose hidden meanings, as the words ‘analysis’ and ‘explication’
would suggest; we supply lacks. We fix on the particular functions
of the unclear expression that make it worth troubling about, and then
devise a substitute, clear and couched in terms of our liking, that
fills those functions beyond those conditions of partial agreement,
dictated by our interests and purposes, any traits of the explicans
come under the head of ‘don’t cares’. (Quine, 1960, §53, my italics)
The ordered pair is a paradigm of philosophical analysis because the function
that any analysis of ‘ordered pair’ must satisfy, can itself be made precise. This
condition is that 〈x, y〉 = 〈w, z〉 only if x=w and y=z.2 All set theoretic defini-
tions of ‘ordered pair’ satisfy this condition.3 Therefore, on Quine’s view, al-
though different explications (e.g. 〈x, y〉 = {{x}, {x, y}} or 〈x, y〉 = {{x}, {∅, y}
}) may contradict one another, they can both be correct analyses because they
both satisfy the relevant condition. It is only by assuming synonymy between
the original notions and the various clarifications that any contradiction arises.
Explication, for Quine, is elimination. We eliminate the vague and poorly un-
derstood class of ordered pairs, and replace talk of ordered pairs with talk of
classes of sets of the appropriate kind.4 We may refer to this class of sets as
the ‘class of ordered pairs’, but this is just for expedience and no claim to syn-
onymy is made.
The similarities with Carnap’s account should be apparent. Quine, as we
saw, himself explicitly acknowledges the agreement. Both accounts reject the
ordinary language account of philosophical analysis and insist that to analyze
a concept is to replace the concept with another that is more precise and use-
ful. We have a good deal of freedom in giving analyses and the choice between
competing analyses is usually not a question of which is the correct one. There
is, however, an important difference between their views on explication. Car-
nap’s requirements for a proper explication will (in general) be satisfied, at
least to a degree, by any explication, and therefore of use mainly for ordering
explications according to which is better, rather than ruling any out. Quine, on
the other hand, provides a necessary condition that any analysis must meet in
order to be a proper explication. In order for an explication to be acceptable,
on Quine’s view, we must be able to identify some particularly important func-
tion of the explanandum that ought to be preserved by any analysis. On Car-
nap’s view, although there should be similarity between the analyzed notion
and the explanandum, we are not responsible for preserving any single aspect
2Since Quine uses the conditional instead of the biconditional, Quine must be thinking of 〈x, y〉
as a function of x and y. In this way the other direction of the biconditional becomes unnecessary.
3Quine also notes that ordered pairs need not be defined as sets at all. In arithmetic the ordered
pair 〈x, y〉 can be defined as 2x ∗ 3y.
4On Quine’s view explication is also elimination in the sense that in general we also eliminate
a type of entity. For example when we define ordered pairs as sets we have eliminated the class of
ordered pairs. The present essay will, however, not deal with ontological questions.
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of the unanalyzed notion. So, though both Carnap and Quine have views on
philosophical analysis that explicitly reject the ordinary language conception
of analysis, there is an important difference between their accounts.
In fact, the rejection of the ordinary language conception of an explication
(or analysis), as exposing hidden meanings, appears to be the main point of
agreement between Carnap and Quine’s views on analysis. The view that we
replace an unclear notion with a clear one, is seen by both as an inevitable
consequence of the paradox of analysis. However, Quine unlike Carnap takes
explanation to involve the identification and preservation of important features
of the explanandum.
Showing how the useful purposes of some perplexing expres-
sion can be accomplished through new channels would seem to
count as explication just in case the new channels parallel the old
ones sufficiently for there to be a striking if partial parallelism of
function between the old troublesome form of expression and some
form of expression figuring in the new method. (Quine, 1960, §53)
It will be seen in the next section that this difference in their views on explica-
tion is sufficient to explain their positions on the question of analyticity.
3 Carnap, Quine, Analysis and Analyticity
As is well known, in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, Quine argues against pro-
posals for an analysis (or explication) of ‘analytic’. The article contains many
arguments against such proposals, but only one of those arguments applies to
Carnap’s analysis. The argument in question states that Carnap has only pro-
vided an analysis of ‘analytic in L1’ or ‘analytic in L2’ rather than an analysis
of ‘analytic in X’ where ‘X’ is a variable.5 Quine argues that because of this
lack, Carnap has no real justification for using the string of letters ‘analytic in’
in both predicates. Quine later acknowledges that he came to understand Car-
nap’s motivation for using the phrase ‘analytic in’ for both predicates and that
motivation is that they have the same explicandum. (Quine & Carnap (1990),
‘Letter to Carnap, March 29, 1951’)6 Despite this situation, and despite Car-
nap’s several attempts to explicate the notion of analyticity, Quine, throughout
his philosophical career, continued to reject the notion of analyticity.7
5There is also a point about state-descriptions being insufficient to define the general notion
of analyticity, but this is not an argument against Carnap, since, as Quine acknowledges, state-
descriptions were never meant to play this role.
6Grice & Strawson (1956) tentatively attribute to Quine the view that there is no clear explican-
dum. They do not more than tentatively attribute this view to Quine, since they think it is highly
implausible that our use of the term ‘analytic’ is not guided by some coherent informal notion. But
Quine need not deny that there is a coherent notion to be explained. What he denies, as will be
argued, is that we can identify an important feature of this notion that needs to be preserved by
any explication. I think Grice and Strawson are right in giving prominence to the task of giving an
analysis. However, without a detailed understanding of what Carnap and Quine each meant by
giving an analysis (explication), the exact nature of the problem is unclear.
7Except in a very restricted sense which will be discussed below.
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It is perhaps easy to see this debate between Carnap and Quine as being
very one-sided. One could side with Carnap and hold that Carnap gave suf-
ficiently clear — in fact, mathematically precise — definitions of analyticity,
but that Quine quite dogmatically refused to accept any of them. On the other
hand, one could see Quine as having made reasonable demands for ‘behavioral
criteria’ that Carnap stubbornly never accepted and thus never met. There
have been recently several attempts (Creath (2007), George (2000), and Stein
(1992)) to give more neutral reading of this debate, such that neither side is
being unreasonable in the face of the opposing position.8 As valuable as these
attempts are, I do not think they are sufficient in explaining how Carnap and
Quine spent so much time talking past each other on this issue. To fully under-
stand this debate, the notion of explication needs to be moved to the center, and
the differences in their views on explication need to be taken into account. The
debate, after all, concerns the question of whether analyticity can be clearly ex-
plicated. In what follows I will give a fully neutral account of the debate where
the concept of explication plays a central role. Each side has his own view of
what constitutes a successful explication and is unaware that this view differs
from that of his opponent in the debate.
How then are we to see this debate as centrally concerning the notion of ex-
plication? Quine’s famous attack on the notion of analyticity is, of course found
in ‘Two Dogmas . . . ’. In fact, ‘Two Dogmas. . . ’ contains a brief discussion of
explication:
In explication the purpose is not merely to paraphrase the definien-
dum into an outright synonymy, but actually to improve upon the
definiendum by refining or supplementing its meaning. But even
explication, though not merely reporting a pree¨xisting synonymy
between definiendum and definiens, does rest nevertheless on other
pre-existing synonymies. The matter may be viewed as follows.
Any word worth explicating has some contexts which, as wholes,
are clear and precise enough to be useful; and the purpose of explica-
8I mentioned George’s reading of the Carnap and Quine debate. I would like, now, to make
a brief point about George on the analytic/synthetic distinction. George shows that Carnap can
easily adopt a Carnapian attitude towards the A/S distinction. That is, Carnap can see it as a mat-
ter of choice whether we accept a system that includes the analytic/synthetic distinction. Quine,
however, on George’s view, is in a very difficult position. George dubs the rejection of the A/S dis-
tinction a ‘double-edged sword’. Quine can neither hold that the existence of the A/S distinction
is an empirical question — since he claims that there has been no empirical meaning given to the
A/S distinction — nor can he claim with Carnap that it is a matter of choice. Quine’s seems then
to have cut his own legs out from beneath him, and fallen into incoherence. George then claims
that Quine avoids incoherence by relying on a delicate balance between his somewhat obscure no-
tion of ‘linguacentrism’ and his empiricism. George concludes that “[d]ebate about whether the
dispute is empty or instead substantive is, for Quine, itself lacking content.” (George, 2000, p. 22)
Despite, George’s best efforts, the position he saddles Quine with is, if not incoherent, dangerously
close to incoherent. The problem I see with George’s analysis is that he takes the participants to
be addressing the question ‘Is there an A/S distinction?’ instead of the question ‘Can analyticity be
successfully analyzed?’ As we will see, once the participants in the debate are seen as addressing
the second question (as their writings on the subject suggest) the problems that George struggles
with simply do not arise.
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tion is to preserve the usage of these favored contexts while sharpening
the usage of other contexts. In order that a given definition be suit-
able for the purpose of explication, therefore, what is required is
not that the definiendum in its antecedent usage be synonymous
with the definiens, but just that each of these favored contexts of
the definiendum, taken as a whole in its antecedent use, be syn-
onymous with the corresponding context of the definiens. (Quine,
1953, p. 25, my italics)
Notice that with this talk of ‘favored contexts’, Quine is here expressing the
same view on explication that he later spells out in more detain in Word &
Object. Although Quine explicitly rejects the ordinary language conception
of philosophical analysis, we are, on Quine’s view, responsible for preserving
some pre-identified aspects of ordinary usage. We can ignore any aspects of or-
dinary use that are of little or no practical utility. However, if we cannot isolate
within ordinary usage valuable distinguishing properties, then any proposed
analysis will be deemed an inadequate explication. So, Quine is here asking
about the possibility of giving an explication of analyticity in exactly the sense
explored in the previous section.
Now that we have considered in some detail their views on explication, let
us investigate further how these positions are related to their views on analyt-
icity. The problem Quine poses in ‘Two Dogmas . . . ’ is to define a notion of
analyticity that is wider than logical truth. That is, the goal is to define analyt-
icity such that it includes logical truths such as ‘all unmarried men are unmar-
ried’, but also includes such truths as ‘all bachelors are unmarried’. If you hold
Carnap’s views on explication, then what you seek is a precise, simple, fruitful
notion that is sufficiently similar to the ordinary notion. Concerning giving an
explication of analyticity, Carnap says:
Our explication [. . . ] will refer to semantic language systems,
not to natural languages. It shares this character with most of the
explications of philosophically important concepts given in modern
logic, e.g., Tarski’s explication of truth. It seems to me that the prob-
lems of explicating concepts of this kind for natural language are of
an entirely different nature. (Carnap, 1956, pp. 222-3, Appendix B)
Since Carnap is merely trying to define, in the context of formal languages, a
concept that is sufficiently similar to our ordinary notion of analyticity, he sees
the task as trivially easy. All that is needed is to supplement the logical system
with meaning postulates. Given the notion of logical truths, the wider class of
sentences are all of the logical consequences of the meaning postulates.
We saw above an important difference between Carnap’s view of explica-
tion and Quine’s. Quine, like Carnap, sees explication as replacing a poorly
understood concept with a clearer more precise one. However, for Quine we
must begin by identifying a feature (or possibly features) of the ordinary notion
that we wish to preserve. Judged according to Quine’s criteria for successful
explication, Carnap’s analysis of analyticity in ‘Meaning Postulates’ is clearly
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inadequate. Interpreted as identifying a property of the term in ordinary lan-
guage that is to be preserved it is simply silly. Thus Quine’s sarcastic comment:
“Semantic rules are distinguishable, apparently, only by the fact of appearing
on a page under the heading ‘Semantic Rules’ ”. (Quine, 1953, p. 33) Or:
Carnap’s present position is that one has specified a language
quite rigorously only when one has fixed, by dint of so-called mean-
ing postulates, what sentences are to count as analytic. The propo-
nent is supposed to distinguish between those of his declarations
which count as meaning postulates, and thus engender analyticity,
and those that do not. This he does, presumably, by attaching the
the label ‘meaning postulate’. (Quine, 1963, p. 404)
What Quine is doing in this passage makes perfect sense in light of the present
analysis. Quine takes it to be a criterion of successful analysis that it identify
an important feature of the ordinary notion. This criterion is completely miss-
ing from Carnap’s notion of explication. Carnap does not at all take himself to
have identified a property of our ordinary notion of analyticity. I will call an
explication that satisfies Quine’s standards a Quinean-explication and one that
satisfies Carnap’s more liberal standards a Carnapian-explication. Both philoso-
phers are addressing the question ‘can we give a successful explication of the
concept analyticity?’ However, each interprets this question differently. Carnap
interprets this question as asking if a successful Carnapian-explication can be
given, and takes the answer to be a trivially obvious yes. Quine, does not see
how to give a successful Quinean-explication of analyticity, sees Carnap as at-
tempting to provide one, and thus sees Carnap as obviously failing. Quine and
Carnap could not agree then on whether a successful explication of analyticity
was possible, and therefore did quite a bit of talking past one another. This
had to do more with the notion of explication than it did with the notion of
analyticity.
It was shown above that Quine seems to have been completely unaware
that his view of explication differs from Carnap’s. Quine, as we saw, enthusi-
astically cites Carnap as first articulating the notion of explication that Quine
wishes to defend. But it was not only Quine who failed to appreciate the differ-
ence between their views on explication. Carnap was completely unaware of
this difference as well. In his ‘Quine on Analyticity’ (which remained unpub-
lished until it was translated and included in Quine & Carnap (1990)), Carnap
repeatedly accuses Quine of being unclear over whether he is talking about the
explicandum or the explicatum. However, Quine is not confusing properties of
the explicandum with those of the explicatum. Quine is looking for features of
the ordinary notion which the explication is meant to preserve. Since this aspect
is entirely missing from a Carapian-explication, Carnap can make little sense
of Quine’s demands. Consider the following passage:
Later Quine says: “Semantic rules <determining the analytic
statements of an artificial language are of interest only insofar as
we already understand the notion of analyticity; they are of no help
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in gaining this> understanding” (op. cit., p. 34). This is the same
obscurity again [confusing properties of the explicatum with those
of the explicandum]. The answer is the same too: we have an un-
derstanding of the notion of analyticity, in practice clear enough for
application in many cases, but not exact enough for certain cases
or for theoretical purposes. The semantic rules give us an exact
concept; we accept it as an explication if we find by comparison
with the explicandum that it is sufficiently in accord with this. It
seems to me that this demand is fulfilled for the two concepts un-
der consideration here with respect to the simple, limited language
systems treated thus far: (1) for the concept L-truth as an explica-
tion of logical truth in the narrow sense, (2) for the concept, based
on meaning postulates, of L-truths as an explicatum for analyticity,
truth in virtue of meaning (in the broad sense). (Quine & Carnap,
1990, p. 431 (the portion in angle brackets was added by Creath to
Carnap’s notes for the sake of the reader.))
Here we see Carnap showing some frustration. He takes there to be fairly
clear cases where the explicandum applies (or not), and takes the notion he has
outlined to be clear and precise and sufficiently similar in extension. He has
thus shown that he has given a successful Carnapian-explication of the notion.9
He does not see what more Quine is asking for. Quine of course need not
disagree with any of this. Quine sees Carnap as having failed to identify which
feature of the explicandum is preserved by the explicatum. That is, Quine seeks
a Quinean-explication of this notion.
Quine’s demands for a Quinean-explication of analyticity were often phrased
in terms of giving behavioral criteria for analyticity. These behavioral criteria
were supposed to play the role of linking a precise definition of analyticity with
an important feature of the ordinary notion. Of course, on Carnap’s view, no
such link is required — all that is required is a certain similarity between the
explicatum and explicandum. It is for this reason that Carnap says “I do not
think that a semantical concept, in order to be fruitful, must necessarily have a
pragmatical counterpart.” (Carnap, 1956, p. 235, appendix D)
Carnap, as we saw, did not understand the nature of Quine’s misgivings
about the notion of analyticity. In particular, Carnap could not understand
how Quine could reject his analysis of analyticity for certain formalized lan-
guages without also rejecting Tarski’s analysis of truth. We are again, given
the present interpretation in a perfect position to understand this. Quine can
accept Tarski’s analysis as a successful explication of truth because Tarski iden-
tifies the feature of our ordinary notion that the analysis is meant to preserve.
That is, for any sentence ‘P’, ‘P’ is true if and only if P. This feature is preserved
between the ordinary notion and the formalized version. On this ground Tarski’s
analysis can qualify as a successful Quinean-explication. It seems Carnap never
really understood what exactly it was about his explications that failed to sat-
9Of course, he also thinks it can be fruitful. For instance if it could be shown that all mathemat-
ical truths are analytic.
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isfy Quine. However, as we saw, Quine did not realize where their differences
lay either.
4 Towards a Quinean-explication of Analyticity
In the last section it was argued that the disagreement, between Carnap and
Quine, over whether a successful explication of analyticity is possible, had
more to do with their views on explication than with the notion of analytic-
ity. It may now be asked which (if either) of these views on explication we
ought to accept. Carnap’s account offers more freedom while giving an anal-
ysis. Conceivably, the fidelity to ordinary notions that is required by Quine’s
analysis may, in some cases, stand in the way of scientific progress. On the
other hand, many of the most clearly successful analyses do meet Quine’s more
strict requirements. We have already seen how Tarski’s analysis of truth satis-
fies Quine’s criteria. The same can be said of Turing’s analysis of a computation
and Einstein’s analysis of simultaneity. Both of these analyses begin by identi-
fying important features involved in our ordinary applications of the concepts.
I have no desire to settle the issue of which (if either) is the best or proper
view on what constitutes a successful explication. Instead, what I wish to do is
to address the question of whether it is possible to give a Quinean-explication
of analyticity. That is, is it possible to identify an important feature of our
ordinary notion of analytic such that giving an explication that preserves this
feature allows us to do those things that make it ‘worth troubling about’ ana-
lyticity in the first place?10
Let me be explicit in what I am doing here. My goal is not to argue that
Quine could have, and therefore should have, defined the notion of analytic-
ity. Quine is interested in outlining a philosophical view that does not include
such notions as ‘analytic’. My point is not at all that there is something ille-
gitimate about this. After all, ‘analyticity’ is a term used by philosophers, it
is neither part of our commonsense view of the world nor our scientific the-
ories. However, Quine often, throughout his philosophical career, made the
stronger claim that one cannot give a successful analysis of ‘analyticity’. It is
this stronger claim that I wish to address here. I will argue that given Quine
believed Quinean-explications are possible, he cannot hold the stronger thesis.
Quine outlines a notion very close to our ordinary notion of analyticity in
at least three places — Word and Object, Roots of Reference, and Pursuit of Truth.11
In Word and Object, Quine outlines the concept of a socialized stimulus-analytic
sentence. A sentence fits into this class if almost all speakers of the language
would assent to it given any stimulus.
But analyticity in this improved sense will apply as well to ‘there
have been black dogs’ as to ‘2 + 2 = 4’ and ‘No bachelor is married.’
10The talk of identifying what it is about the notion that makes it worth troubling about comes
from §53 of Word and Object (as quoted above).
11Dummett (1978) discusses the example of Word & Object and Creath (2007) discusses the re-
maining examples.
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Let us face it: our socialized stimulus-synonymy and stimulus-analyticity
are not behavioral reconstructions of intuitive semantics, but only
behavioristic ersatz. (Quine, 1960, §14)
Quine’s complaint here is not that he has not defined this notion in behavioris-
tic terms, nor is it that the notion as he defines it has no relation to the ordinary
notion of analytic truth. To see what exactly the problem is here, consider this
evidently related passage from ‘Epistemology Naturalized’:
This attribute [community-wide acceptance] is of course no ex-
plication of analyticity. The community would agree that there
have been black dogs, yet none who talk of analyticity would call
this analytic. My rejection of the analyticity notion just means draw-
ing no line between between what goes into the mere understand-
ing of the sentences of a language and what else the community
sees eye-to-eye on. I doubt that a distinction can be made between
meaning and such collateral information as is community wide.
(Quine, 1969, pp. 86)
In ‘Two dogmas in retrospect’ Quine clearly points out that he does not
reject that there is a coherent notion of analyticity, as used by philosophers, that
includes such sentences as ‘No bachelor is married’. “Analyticity undeniably
has a place at a common-sense level, and this has made readers regard my
reservations as unreasonable.” (Quine, 2008, p. 395) In response to this he
mentions his definition of analyticity given in Roots of Reference:
Here then we may at last have a line on the concept of analytic-
ity: a sentence is analytic if everybody learns that it is true by learn-
ing its words. Analyticity, like observationality, hinges on social
uniformity. (Quine, 1973, p.79 original italics)
However, he points out that this definition does not extend beyond a handful
of clear cases:
For the past five minutes I have been expressing a generous atti-
tude toward analyticity. In fact my reservations over analyticity are
the same as ever, and concern the tracing of any demarcation, even
an approximate one, across the domain of sentences in general. The
crude criterion of Roots of Reference, based on word learning, is no
help; we don’t in general know how we learned a word, nor what
truths were learned in the process. Nor do we have any reason to
expect any uniformity in this regard from speaker to speaker, and
there is no reason to care. Elementary logic and the bachelor ex-
ample are clear enough cases, but there is no going on from there.
(Quine, 2008, p. 396)
So we see that Quine’s own attempts to come up with a Quinean-explication
of analyticity either included far too much or far less than more traditional ac-
counts of analyticity. Community-wide acceptance is far too broad to count as
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an analysis of analyticity. This may be a feature of the ordinary notion, but it
is insufficient to pin down the notion of analyticity. It is akin to identifying 〈x,
y〉 = 〈w, z〉 only if x=w as all that is needed to be preserved of the notion of
ordered pair. Although this is true of ordered pairs, it is not yet sufficient to
pin down what we mean beyond the ‘don’t cares’.
The analysis of analyticity in terms of what everyone learns is true by learn-
ing the component words is an acceptable explication of analyticity, on Quine’s
view. It identifies a feature of the ordinary notion that is to be preserved. It is
just that this feature gives us very little. We get ‘there are seven days in a week’
and ‘if P and Q, then P’ as analytic, but not much more than these obvious
examples of analytic truths. Of course, Quine is perfectly satisfied with this
explication:
In short, I recognize analyticity in its obvious and useful but
epistemically insignificant applications. The needs that Carnap felt
for this notion in connection with mathematical truth are better met
through holism. (Quine, 2008, p. 397)
The purpose of this section was to tackle the question of whether a Quinean-
explication of analyticity is possible. Quine’s final answer to this question is
essentially ‘yes, but the notion turns out to be so elementary that it is not of
much interest’. So we may now ask if we can do somewhat better than this.
That is, can we identify a feature of sentences that we call analytic, and use this
feature to define a class that is wider than Quine’s ‘epistemically uninterest-
ing’ class but not so wide so as to include everything that is widely believed?
The goal is not to arrive at the ultimate and authoritative definition of analytic,
but to show that there is at least one way to define analyticity that satisfies
Quine’s demands and can be shown to be of philosophical interest. Given what
has been shown in the preceding sections, a particular account suggests itself.
What feature of our the notion of analyticity should we seek to preserve? I sug-
gest the following feature: analytic truths are what is identified in the process
of giving an analysis. To make sure the definition cannot be rejected outright
by Quine, the notion of analysis I will use is that of a Quinean-explication.
In §53 of Word and Object, Quine has essentially two points. First, there is an
important and interesting activity that we refer to as giving an explication of
some notion. Secondly, the various explications of the ordered pairs exemplify
this perfectly. When examining how we use the term ‘ordered pair’, we notice
that beyond satisfying the principle (that Quine calls (1)):
(1) 〈x, y〉 = 〈w, z〉 only if x=w and y=z
any other features of ordered pair fall into the category of ‘don’t cares’. I
suggest we build an account of analyticity around the notion of successful
Quinean-explication. After all, these two ideas have been traditionally linked.
Since Quine’s own account of analyticity is, in his own estimation, of no par-
ticular interest, I will use the term Quinean-analytic to refer to the notion of
analyticity suggested by Quine’s account of successful analysis. The feature of
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the ordinary notion of analyticity we will preserve is that the analytic truths
are those identified in the course of giving an analysis. Let me now be explicit
about this:
Quinean-Analyticity: A statement is Quinean-analytic if (and
only if) it is either a statement identified as what must preserved
by an acceptable Quinean-explication, or is a logical consequence
of such statements.
I should now say something about the use of the word ‘acceptable’ in the above
definition. Obviously, it would not do to count as analytic anything which any-
one identifies as something that needs to preserve in giving an analysis of some
notion. Some proposed Quinean-analyses will clearly be unacceptable. Quine
himself certainly thinks so. After all, he denies that Carnap gave an acceptable
analysis of analyticity. On the other hand, Quine focuses on the example of
ordered pair, because he thinks in this case it is clear what any acceptable anal-
ysis must preserve. “The ordered pair has had illustrative value because of the
crispness of requirement (1) and because of the multiplicity and the conspic-
uous artificiality of the explications. But what it illustrates as to the nature of
philosophical explication applies more widely.” (Quine, 1960, §53) Here, Quine
speaks of this as involving a Wittgensteinean dissolution of the problem of
whether the ordered pairs are really the Wiener or Kuratowski version. In this
case we can clearly separate what is important (and thus needs to be preserved
by any explication) and what is an artificial property of the explication. Quine
takes the ordered pair to be a paradigm of philosophical analysis. What Quine
called (1), therefore, is a paradigm example of a Quinean-analytic sentence in
the sense just defined.
It might now be pointed out that, although there are clear cases where the
concept applies and clear cases in which it does not, there may still be many
borderline cases. But this only shows that analyticity, as so defined, is no more
and no less vague that the notion of Quinean-explication. Quine could not,
therefore, hold that Quinean-explication (what he called philosophical analy-
sis) is important and philosophically illuminating, while analyticity is hope-
lessly unclear. Neither can Quine object by claiming that an explication ought
to have no borderline cases at all. Certainly what everyone learns is true by
learning the component words is not completely devoid of vagueness. Another
objection might be that the ‘must’ in the definition adds further vagueness.
This, of course, is not true, since giving an acceptable Quinean-explication al-
ready involves identifying what must be preserved about the ordinary notion
being examined.
Carnap’s definition of ‘analytic’ is certainly related to his account of expli-
cation. In fact, this may be seen as one of the most unsatisfying features of
Carnap’s philosophy. In terms of explications, as we saw, his attitude is that
no explications are really incorrect, but are simply to be judged on pragmatic
grounds. Likewise, any set of sentences (closed under logical consequence)
is a perfectly acceptable candidate for the class of analytic truths and we are,
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again, to judge between these on pragmatic grounds. As I have argued else-
where (Lavers, 2008), Carnap, when engaged in actually explicating a notion
like classical mathematical truth, does not propose simply replacing our or-
dinary notion with some sufficiently similar copy. He does not advocate, for
instance, replacing our ordinary notion of truth of number theory with the prop-
erty of being a provable sentence in first-order Peano arithmetic. Instead, he
seeks to defend the the notion of classical mathematical truth by showing that
although it cannot be captured in terms of deducibility in some particular for-
mal system, it can, nonetheless, be sufficiently clearly defined. Although there
may not be a contradiction between his views on explication and his attempt
to defend our ordinary notion of mathematical truth, it certainly seems that the
view of analysis guiding him in this case is something other than an attitude
of anything goes and is to be judged on pragmatic grounds. If this is right, then
even those sympathetic to a Carnapian point of view would welcome a more
interesting account of analysis (or explication) and analyticity.
Let us, therefore, return to the suggestion made above that we construct a
notion of analyticity around what Quine considered to be a clear case of suc-
cessful analysis. First, it should be noted that this differs from Quine’s own
attempts to define analyticity. On the present account ‘〈x, y〉 = 〈w, z〉 only if
x=w and y=z’ is the paradigmatic example of an analytic statement. But it is
not true of this statement that it is universally acknowledged by all speakers
of the English language. If one were to conduct a survey to determine what
portion of people would assent to this statement, one is bound to get a variety
of answers in response. So it does not satisfy Quine’s first attempt at an anal-
ysis of analyticity — that of community-wide acceptance.12 Nor does it satisfy
Quine’s final definition of analyticity. Remember, on this account a truth is an-
alytic if everyone learns it is true by learning its words. Although anyone with
a competent grasp of the notion of an ordered pair can recognize that this sen-
tence is true, it is not the case (as a historical matter of fact) that for each of us
we recognized the truth of this claim by learning the words. So, the above no-
tion of a Quinean-analytic sentence is a notion that differs from the attempts at
an explication of analyticity made by Quine himself. As we saw above, Quine
himself declared his very narrow definition of analyticity as unsuitable to play
any significant role in the foundations of mathematics. Of course, this is as
Quine wished, since he wanted to present an alternative epistemological pic-
ture to that of Carnap. But in the next section we will explore the status of
mathematics in relation to the notion of a Quinean-analytic sentence.
12Of course, if we could choose our community as we wish this could come out as accepted by
the entire community. But the notion of Quinean-analyticity remains different from community-
wide acceptance. If we select a small enough community a feature that is not Quinean-analytic but
a ‘don’t care’ might be accepted by the entire community.
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5 Quinean-Analyticity and Mathematical Truth
The last section introduced the concept of a Quinean-analytic statement. It was
shown that this notion is more substantial than Quine’s own of ‘epistemically
insignificant’ definition of analyticity. We now turn to the question of the status
of mathematical axioms with respect to this newly introduced notion. Let us
begin with arithmetic, and then later we will turn to set theory.13 Quine is
quite clear that we can identify what must be preserved by any analysis of the
natural numbers:
The condition upon all acceptable explications of number (that
is, the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, . . . ) can be put almost as succinctly as
(1): any progression i.e., any infinite series each of whose members
has only finitely many precursors — will do nicely. (Quine, 1960,
§54)
Given that the above-defined notion of Quinean-analyticity applies to anything
that is preserved by all explications, the Quinean-analytic truths of arithmetic
are all those statements that are true of any such progression. What two such
progressions may disagree over goes under the head ‘don’t cares’.
One uses Frege’s version or von Neumann’s or yet another, such
as Zermelo’s, opportunistically to suit the job in hand, if the job is
one that calls for providing a version of number at all. (Quine, 1960,
§54)
One of the motivations for the account of analyticity provided in the last sec-
tion is that it suggests itself in light of what was discussed earlier.14 The other
motivation is the connection with mathematical truth. Remember, after Quine
presents his own ‘epistemically insignificant’ concept of analyticity he points
out that it does not meet Carnap’s needs in terms of mathematical truth. But
here we have Quine saying what must be preserved by any analysis of the nat-
ural numbers can be made perfectly clear. That is, he is saying that the truths of
arithmetic, what are true of all such progressions, are Quinean-analytic. So, by
Quine’s own lights, the truths of arithmetic count as Quinean-analytic.
One may now see a connection between what has just been discussed and
Benacerraf’s famous paper ‘What numbers could not be’. In this paper Benac-
erraf discusses the case of Ernie and Johnny who have each had an unusual
mathematical education. They each learned set theory before they learned
13Since these are the examples Quine himself discusses.
14I am not claiming that this is the only possible definition of analyticity. Others, for instance Juhl
& Loomis (2010) or Russell (2008), have recently put forward their own definition of analyticity. I
have no interest in arguing that the definition given here is better than theirs. My goal is merely to
show that there is at least one interesting definition of analyticity that satisfies Quine’s demands
for a successful explication. Showing that it counts much of mathematics as analytic is the way
I intend to show that the definition provided above is of interest. If the reader feels that I have
given merely one interesting definition of analyticity among many possible, I will be sufficiently
satisfied.
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arithmetic. One was then taught arithmetic by being given a definition of the
numbers as the Zermelo ordinals and a rule for associating numbers with the
cardinality of sets. The other was taught to identify the numbers with the Von
Neumann ordinals, and is similarly given a rule for associating numbers with
the cardinality of sets. Benacerraf argues that each will be able to begin to de-
rive truths of arithmetic. Of course:
Comparing notes, they soon became aware that something was
wrong, for a dispute immediately ensued about whether or not 3
belonged to 17. Ernie said that it did, Johnny that it did not. At-
tempts to settle this by asking ordinary folk (who had been dealing
with numbers as numbers for a long time) understandably brought
only blank stares. (Benacerraf, 1965, p. 54)
We see here that Quine and Benacerraf agree on quite a bit. They both agree
that the important truths about the numbers are precisely what we have been
calling the Quinean-analytic truths. But they diverge after this point. Quine
takes it that what is left undecided by these privileged truths we may fill in
as we wish — so long as we don’t lose sight that these properties fall under
the heading ‘don’t cares’. Benacerraf concludes that since there is no particular
sequence singled out as the series of natural numbers, that the natural numbers
are not any particular series at all.
Interestingly, Benacerraf, here, makes an explicit comparison with Quine’s
view from Word and Object. He points out two more differences between him-
self and Quine. Quine considers and rejects, as a requirement on an explication
of number, that it ought to tie claims of pure arithmetic to our judgement of car-
dinality. Benacerraf disagrees with Quine on this: “It will then be from its place
in that sequence that is, from its relation to other members of the sequence, and
from the rules governing the use of the sequence in counting that it will derive
its individuality. It is for this last reason that I urged, contra Quine, that the
account of cardinality must explicitly be included in the account of number.”
[p. 72] Benacerraf also holds that the less-than relation must be recursive in
order for a progression to count as the numbers. This is not a disagreement
over whether it is the Quinean-analytic truths that are the important ones, but
about what counts as Quinean-analytic.15 These differences about what features
ought to be preserved by any explication do not show the notion of Quinean-
analyticity irremediably vague. It shows that we are perhaps fallible in respect
to identifying Quinean-analytic truths but there is no reason to abandon hope
that such disputes could be settled with debate. Let us leave aside, then, these
specific differences of what all accounts of number must have in common and
return to the more global features of their views.
As close as their positions are, I think there is good reason, still, to prefer
Quine’s way of viewing things. For Quine the important thing is to identify
those features that are preserved by any acceptable analysis and to differenti-
ate those things from the ‘don’t cares’. While Benacerraf is largely in agreement
15Of course, they do not use the term Quinean-analytic, but are arguing about what features any
specific account of number must have. This is exactly what we have been calling Quinean-analytic.
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with this, he wants to make the further conclusion that numbers are not any
particular progression, but that the properties of the numbers are what all such
progressions have in common. This of course brings with it a certain well-
known incoherence. ‘Numbers are not any particular progression’ is certainly
not true no matter what progression we use to represent the numbers — in fact,
it is false on all of them. Such difficulties may not be insurmountable, but I
think Quine’s view is able to satisfy many of our structuralist instincts without
even skirting incoherence. Instead of saying ‘Numbers are not any particular
progression, but what is true of number is what is true of all such progres-
sions’ we say ‘that the numbers are progression X is not Quinean-analytic, but
what is true of all progressions is just what is Quinean-analytic of the notion of
number.’
Quine held that, in general, a specific progression proposed as an explica-
tion of our concept of number will consist of sets. Quine also generally views
explication as a kind of ontological reduction. As mentioned before questions
of ontology will not be dealt with in the current paper. It is nonetheless impor-
tant, now, to turn our attention to sets in order to identify what might be called
Quinean-analytic in this case. Sets (or classes) are certainly an important case
in Quine’s view:
Classes can do the work of ordered pairs and therefore relations
(§53), and they can do the work of the natural numbers (§54). They
can do the work of richer sorts of number too — rational, real, com-
plex; for these can be variously explicated on the basis of natural
numbers by suitable constructions of classes and relations. Numer-
ical functions, in turn, can be explicated as relations of numbers.
All the universe of classes leaves no further objects to be desired
for the whole of classical mathematics.(Quine, 1960, §55)
What pushes strongly in favour of nominalism, on Quine’s view, is the lack
of naturalness in the conception of set. As Quine sees things, all of the various
set theories that exist today restrict comprehension in an unnatural way in or-
der to avoid the paradoxes. On Quine’s view, then, all such systems, serve as
practical tools, but because of their unnaturalness are not explications of some
pre-existing notion. This view on the history of set theory, which sees Zer-
melo’s axioms, for instance, as making arbitrary restrictions on comprehension
to avoid paradox, has today fallen out of favour. It is certainly now not taken
for granted that there is one natural (although inconsistent) notion of set, Frege
and Russell’s, and then arbitrary and ad hoc ones. Many philosophers of math-
ematics now recognize that, for instance, Cantor and Zermelo did not share
the same notion of set as Frege and Russell. It has furthermore been argued
that Zermelo’s axioms are obtained by an analysis of Cantor’s notion of a set. I
will not make this case here, but simply refer the reader to, for instance, Kreisel
(1967) and Hallett (1984). If this claim, that the Zermelo axioms are obtained
by an analysis of a certain conception of set, can be defended, then, as a conse-
quence, these axioms (and their consequences) become Quinean-analytic of an
important conception of sets.
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So far, things have turned out quite happily for us. We seem to get, as com-
ing out analytic, exactly those sentences we would want. There is of course
some bad news. We are not, given our postponing ontological questions for
another occasion, able to claim that all Quinean-analytic statements are true. I
think this view can be defended and have argued for it in my (Lavers, 2009).16
Regardless of whether all Quinean-analytic claims come out true, I believe the
notion of a Quinean-analytic truth is more interesting than Quine’s own at-
tempts to define analyticity.17
There is one last point that needs to be made about the notion of Quinean-
analyticity. Recall Quine’s criticism of community-wide acceptance as an anal-
ysis of analyticity. Here he thinks the analysis fails because ‘there have been
black dogs’ would come out analytic. One could at least conceive of someone
giving an analysis of some notion that includes a quite clearly empirical claim.
We might, to use Quine’s own example, imagine an explication of the concept
of ‘dog’ that saw it as an important feature of this concept that there have been
black dogs. However, it was mentioned above, in connection with Benacer-
raf’s criticism of Quine, that we are of course not infallible in identifying the
Quinean-analytic features of some concept. There is always room for debate.
In this case, it might be shown, for example, that an account that does not in-
clude the claim that there have been black dogs does just as well in explicating
how we usefully employ the term ‘dog’.18 We could then eliminate the empir-
ical claim as an inessential part of our explication. It seems to me that this will
always be possible, whenever an explication includes an empirical claim, but I
will not provide a detailed argument here. However, the mere possibility that
what we identify as a Quinean-analytic claim might include empirical knowl-
edge, only shows that what we have (fallibly) identified as Quinean-analytic is
not guaranteed to be a priori. As we saw, Quine himself saw important truths
of arithmetic as having the feature we are calling ‘Quinean-analytic’. We may
have less confidence in the a priori status of arithmetical truths following from
their Quinean-analyticity than if we provided a gapless derivation from purely
logical laws. In this case, we may have reason to believe the laws of arithmetic
are a priori even if we have not rigorously demonstrated them to be so.
Conclusions
We saw above that Carnap had a more liberal notion of explication than Quine.
Quine’s view of explication (a Quinean-explication) holds that in providing
an explication the goal is to identify important features of the explicandum
16I don’t use the terminology of ‘Quinean-analytic’ in this article, but I do argue that what we
identify by analyzing our informal mathematical notions is true.
17Of course, Quine wanted to put forward an epistemic view that did not include the notion of
analyticity. It is certainly not being claimed that Quine himself would be completely satisfied with
the views presented in this paper.
18That is we might give an account according to which this sentence is not analytic — not an
account according to which it is not true.
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that ought to be preserved. There is no parallel in the notion of a Carnapian-
explication. We saw that neither Carnap, nor Quine was aware of this dif-
ference between their views on explications. Thus when they were address-
ing the question, of whether the concept of analyticity can be successfully ex-
plicated, they each interpreted the question as involving their own views on
explication. It is for this reason that neither side in the debate could prop-
erly understand the other. We then saw that an interesting notion of analyt-
icity (Quinean-analyticity) can be constructed out of the notion of a Quinean-
explication. According to Quine’s own words, arithmetic has the feature we
have called Quinean-analytic. Quine did not think that, for instance, the Zer-
melo axioms were arrived at by analyzing an already existing conception of set
but simply by ad hoc stipulation. Subsequent work in the history and philoso-
phy of set theory has made Quine’s position here seem very dubious. Thus, it
is likely defensible that all the recognized truths of classical mathematics have
the property we have called Quinean-analytic. Of course, we closed by a dis-
cussion of the remaining problems for the notion of Quinean-analyticity. Those
problems are that we cannot be sure that a Quinean-analytic claim is true, nor
that it is a priori if it is true. I believe that both of these problems can be ad-
dressed. The first involves getting into problems of ontology that were brack-
eted from the present discussion. The second would involve addressing the
question of whether there is a Quinean-explication that ineliminably involves
empirical claims. But these two further questions will be left to be addressed
elsewhere.
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